This paper attempts a concise overview of the Eurozone crisis that began in 2010 and some ideas regarding the path ahead. The euro's founding documents enshrined such principles as fiscal constraints, the "no bailout clause," and assignment to the ECB of the goal of low inflation to the exclusion of monetizing national debts. Those principles have been permanently compromised. On the one hand, German taxpayers cannot be expected to agree to bailouts of periphery members without end. On the other hand, if they were to insist on those founding principles, the euro would not survive. It is especially important to recognize that the (predictable) impact of fiscal austerity has been to reduce output in the periphery countries, not raise it, and thereby to raise debt/GDP ratios, not lower them. The leaders began to take some steps in the right directions in 2012. But the crisis is not truly over. The Eurozone will endure, but through a decade or more of lost growth. It would help if the ECB further eased monetary policy, which it could accomplish by buying US treasury bonds in place of euro bonds. As to a long-run fiscal regime that addresses the now-exacerbated problem of moral hazard, two innovations favored by the author are the blue bonds proposal and the delegation of forecasting to independent fiscal agencies.
monetary union in the run-up to 1999. 3 The literature said that a country shouldn't give up the ability to respond to asymmetric (i.e., idiosyncratic) shocks, e.g., the freedom to respond to a local downturn by easing monetary policy and devaluing the currency, unless it can compensate with other mechanisms such as high labor mobilitymechanisms that Europe lacked.
Problem 2. The architects of the euro in 1991 focused sharply on the fiscal moral hazard problem, surprising economists at the time by virtually ignoring problem 1. 4 They put fiscal and debt limits at the heart of the Maastricht criteria for entry (3% of GDP and 60 %, respectively), they adopted a "No Bailout Clause," and later they agreed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its successors. They deserve credit for recognizing the moral hazard problem early, because fiscal policy constraints had not previously been featured in the scholars' lists of Optimum Currency Area criteria. Two huge qualifications, however, negate that kudos: (i) The elites were forced to do it politically by voters in Germany --often used in this paper as short-hand for Northern
European creditor countries --who were opposed to the euro on the grounds that "we know you will have us bailing out a profligate Mediterranean government before you're done." (ii) Soon after the euro's inauguration it became very clear that the attempt to address problem 2 had failed: that fiscal criteria were being violated continuously, that the SGP had no teeth and no credibility, and that -because Mediterranean country spreads relative to Germany had all but disappeared (Figure 1 ) -the markets must have believed that the ECB would bail out any countries that got into debt trouble. In other 3 As related by Jonung and Drea (2009) . Interestingly, the originators of the Optimum Currency Area criteria -- McKinnon (1963) and Mundell (1961) , both born Canadian --were more supportive of European Monetary Union and fixed exchange rates generally, than the American critics. 4 E.g., Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993) ; Frankel (1993) ; Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) .
words, the moral hazard problem, though correctly identified, had not been effectively addressed. Virtually all members, big and small, had violated the fiscal criteria, well before the euro crisis began in late 2009.
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Figure 1: Convergence of periphery-countries' interest rates to Germany's after they joined the euro suggests no perceived default risk Problem 3, banking supervision, was at best mentioned in passing in the 1990s.
Almost no thought was given to the possibility of moving deposit insurance, supervision, or bank resolution, to the ECB level.
When crisis struck, the three kinds of failure and the causal connections among them featured with differing degrees of importance in different countries. At one end of the Eurozone, Greece was the purest example of a fiscal disaster. The Greek budget deficit in truth had never been brought below the 3% of GDP ceiling, nor did the 100% debt/GDP ratio ever even decline in the direction of the 60% limit as it was supposed to do. (See Figure 2. ) And it was in Greece that the sovereign debt problem burst forth in October 2009, kicking off the euro crisis, when the incoming government revealed that the 2009 budget deficit was not 3.7 per cent of GDP as previously claimed, but more like 13.7 per cent. There was a close connection between the Greeks' fiscal problem and the erosion in competitiveness, as the national failure to live within their means translated into higher wages without productivity gains.
Figure 2: The Greek budget deficit had never come below the 3% of GDP ceiling, nor did the 100% debt/GDP ratio ever decline in the direction of the 60% limit. The trinity of structural flaws --asymmetry, fiscal, and banking -is a useful way to organize analysis of the crisis and remedies. But one hears of a more colorful tripartite distinction based on national cultural proclivities: Some say that the critical problem is
Mediterranean profligacy, others say it is German severity, and still others that it is Anglo-American financial markets.
It is important to sound a note of American humility and admit that under-recognized shortcomings in our financial markets did indeed give us the housing peak of 2006, the sub-prime mortage crisis of 2007, the global financial crisis of 2008, and the global recession of 2009, and that these events were in turn the trigger for the euro crisis of 2010-12. Having said that, however, let us move on. If the GFC had not been the shock that triggered the euro crisis, sooner or later it would have been something else.
That leaves us with the tension between profligacy and austerity. This tension is indeed central, both to the long-term structural problems, where the issue is preventing profligacy, and to the short-term macroeconomic situation, where faith in austerity has been grossly excessive.
II. Addressing the Three Structural Problems
Let us now turn to the question what changes would be required for a more stable currency union. All three structural problems call for wrenching changes.
Just a paragraph on problem 3, banking. European leaders began to take steps in the right directions in 2012. One of them was the decision to move banking supervision functions from the national level to the level of the European Central Bank, though
Germany has resisted moving supervision of all banks to the ECB level. The stress tests by the European Bank Authority in 2014 and simultaneous Asset Quality Review by the ECB were major steps forward.
Although federalizing banking supervision is not easy, addressing the other two problems is far more difficult still. The productivity side is likely to be as difficult politically as the wage side, because it requires things like cutting bureaucratic red tape, opening up the professions, and liberalizing labor markets. The silver lining is that these are reforms that should have been done anyway, but that were not going to get done short of a severe and lasting crisis.
They should have received more attention from the troika relative to austerity, because they are good for output and employment rather than bad for it. 8 Keynesians often argue that such supply-side reforms can only have a very slow impact over time. But allowing more shops to stay open on Sundays and liberalizing licensing for taxis and pharmacies, to take three small but salient examples, could boost employment almost immediately.
The fiscal problem was perhaps the most difficult of all. I am tempted to say "impossible," given current economic and political realities. Just as was predicted by most independent economists, the fiscal austerity programs made the recessions much 8 Alesina and Perotti (2010) . rather than falling, which was supposed to be the point of fiscal austerity in the first place. There was no way to get back to sustainable debt paths in some countries, without debt reductions such as the partial write-down that belatedly came about for Greece.
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Even five years after the euro crisis hit, there is still no plan for bringing debt/GDP ratios back down, other than running primary surpluses that seem impossibly ambitious. 
III. Comparisons with the United States
Comparisons with the successful monetary union that is the United States are useful. Let us pause, however, for a second note of American humility: the US achieved fiscal incompetence after the turn of the century that was as bad as the Eurozone's. We don't even have the excuse of needing to reach agreement among 19 different national legislatures. 12 That said, it is a close contest as to who has made more mistakes since
2001.
The grounds on which many economists were skeptical of EMU ex ante were specifically the correct observation that the prospective euro members did not satisfy the OCA criteria among themselves as well as the 50 American states did: trade, symmetry of shocks, labor mobility, market flexibility, or countercyclical cross-state fiscal transfers.
12 "19" counts Lithuania, which joined the Eurozone January 1, 2015. This was mostly wrong --think of the French 35-hour workweek --unless the crisis finally helps to bring it about now in such countries as Greece and Italy.
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The issue of fiscal moral hazard has turned out to be at least as relevant as the OCA criteria, however, and this is where I believe that European leaders should have been looking more carefully at the US example. After all, the US federal government has not bailed out a single state in two centuries. Nobody expects it to do so, no matter how deep a hole the state government in question gets itself into. How did the US vanquish state-level moral hazard?
The question is especially relevant with respect to crisis-era reforms, championed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that seek to give future enforceability and credibility to the Eurozone targets for deficits and debt, after the repeated earlier failures of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Fiscal Compact has technically been in effect since 2013. It sets deficit targets that are stricter than under the SGP, though at least they are specified in cyclically adjusted terms. 14 Surveillance of national budgets includes a requirement that they be submitted ex ante to the EU Commission. And, as under its predecessor agreement the 2011 Euro-Plus Plan, countries are required permanently to put the euro-wide targets into their national laws and institutions. As rationale, some point to fiscal rules among the 50 individual American states, believing that they must be the explanation why we don't suffer from moral hazard in state budgets. Others suggest 13 Major labor reforms did take place in the Netherlands, followed in 2002 by Germany's Hartz reforms under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. But these are not readily characterized as structural convergence to facilitate EMU. 14 E.g., Lane (2012) .
that the explanation is the tendency for interest rate spreads on the debts of spendthrift American states to rise, long before debt/income ratios reach anything like European levels.
In my view, the state rules and the existence of spreads are best viewed as endogenous, the outcome of two structural decisions that were made long ago: First was the decision, made simultaneously and integrally with the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789, to move most spending and taxing powers from the states to the federal level. Second was the decision to let 8 states (plus Florida, then a territory)
default on their debts in 1841-42 rather than bail them out, a critical precedent. These two structural features of the federal system mean that when the interest spread warning alarm is sounded, a state need only adjust spending or taxes by a few percentage points of income to get back on a stable debt path. In Europe, by the time the interest rate alarm had sounded it was too late: no primary budget surplus would have been big enough to get Greece back on a path of declining debt to GDP.
It is futile to identify as the euro's key flaw the decision not to establish a fiscal union to match the monetary union as the US did in 1789. The 13 founding American states chose to ratify the US Constitution voluntarily, after a vigorous debate. European political majorities did not come close to favoring a fiscal union in the 1990s. Indeed they almost certainly didn't even support the euro, which is the reason why the elites always avoided asking the people's opinion on the "European project" whenever possible. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Federalist Papers, no matter how cleverly written could change European public opinion on this score. After all, the public was right when it feared that it would eventually be asked to bail out a profligate country and the elite was wrong when they said they had the situation under control.
It is fair game however to argue that everything might have been different if Greece was the ideal test case, for two reasons. First, unlike Ireland or Spain, it was egregiously at fault. The Hellenic Republic would have been a natural place to draw a line, and its creditors were the natural ones to suffer losses. Second, unlike Italy, it was small enough that other governments and systemically important banks could have been protected from the consequences of a default with a fraction of the bailout money that has since been put up by the EFSF, the ESM, the EIB, and the ECB itself.
In early 2010 the leaders should have encouraged the Greeks to go to the IMF and, if necessary, to restructure their debts. 15 Instead the ECB and the EC said at the time that going to the IMF and restructuring were both "unthinkable." They thought that the precedents of emerging market crises in the 1980s and 1990s could not possibly hold any lessons for "advanced" European countries. Embarrassed, they swept the problem under the rug, kicked the can down the road, or -my preferred metaphor -stuck their ostrich heads into the sand. Their excuse was fear of contagion. But the result was that they made the eventual contagion much worse than it had to be. Given a small localized Greece fire and a natural fire-break separating it from the forest, they declined to make their stand at the fire-break and instead waited until it had spread far and wide in the forest. By late 2010 the fire had spread to Portugal, Ireland and Spain; debt/GDP levels and sovereign spreads had climbed much higher, and the euro leaders had lost much of their credibility.
But that is looking back. We have been asked to look forward in this session. No one can predict what will happen. For what it's worth, the Eurozone will survive. It has come too far to turn back now.
IV. Does Monetary Union Require Fiscal Integration?
Even though full fiscal union is not in the cards, monetary union does require some fiscal integration that was not originally agreed at Maastricht,. "More Europe" is inescapable. Returning to sustainable debt paths among some Mediterranean countries requires additional purchases by the European authorities (ECB, EFSF, ESM, or EIB) of their bonds and/or write-downs. Given that by now most of the debt is either held by these same agencies or else by private banks that will need to be protected, write-downs will require some further de facto transfers, though it should require national conditionality, as always. This entails fiscal integration along some dimensions.
But full fiscal union on the order of the US is not politically possible, certainly not in the short or medium run. Again: the German taxpayers who were afraid that the euro would lead to a fiscal bailout were proven right and the elites who assured them they had it all under control were proven wrong Why should they believe them this time?
Taxpayers in Germany (and the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria) have been forced to accept steps that look much like fiscal transfers, when confronted with the alternative of the breakup of euroland. 16 The challenge is how to combine transfers today with a credible promise that there won't be a repetition in the future. I would rate this as even more difficult to solve, at this late date, than the competitiveness problem, which is in turn more difficult than the banking problem. But the Europeans have to try, and I have some thoughts on how to go about it. The final section of the paper explains some ideas on how to avoid repetition in the future, in the long run, after the current debt burden has been addressed. But first we consider what more the ECB can do in the short run.
V. Monetary policy
The ECB followed too tight a policy in the first years of the global financial crisis Yes, monetary easing is likely to mean higher inflation rates and more euro depreciation than would otherwise occur. But that would be the point: it would be especially difficult for the Mediterranean countries to improve their price competitiveness if they had to do it entirely through deflation. It would be easier if German inflation is allowed temporarily to go above 2%. Furthermore it will be much easier for them to improve their competitiveness globally if the euro depreciates. Northern Europe has too big a trade surplus anyway, not just vis-à-vis Southern Europe but also vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Finally, inflation and euro depreciation would also gradually help bring down debt/GDP ratios.
Of course inflation and depreciation give the Bundesbank heart attacks. Many
Germans would put these two words on the same list of morally repugnant promisebreaking as debt write-downs, the very existence of the EFSF and ESM, and -worst of all -ECB purchases of troubled bonds. And in a sense they would be right. I am not one of those who belittle the Germans' "morality tale" perspective as a cultural oddity. It is understandable, especially given the history. But if the euro is to survive (which is defined as France and Germany both staying in, at the very minimum), the Germans must give way on these things, even though they very deliberately did not sign up for them at the beginning. And they especially must give way on the absurd premise that austerity is expansionary, as if we learned nothing from the 1930s. Probably they will indeed continue to give way, kicking and screaming the whole time.
VI. The ECB Could Do QE via FX
A proposal that the ECB buy US bonds 18 strikes most as a radical notion. The ECB has never previously considered such a thing, let alone done it, and has not intervened in the foreign exchange markets in either direction in 15 years. But the idea should be viewed not only as not radical, but as rather natural.
As noted, it is widely recognized that the ECB should further ease monetary policy. Under current conditions it is hard for the periphery countries to bring their costs the rest of the way back down to internationally competitive levels as they need to do. If inflation is below 1% euro-wide, then the periphery countries have to suffer painful deflation.
The question is how the ECB can ease, since short-term interest rates are already low. The ECB is widely urged to undertake QE, following the path of the Fed and the Bank of Japan, expanding the money supply by buying the bonds of member countries. What, then, should the ECB buy, if is to expand the monetary base? It should not buy Euro securities, but rather US treasury securities, even though this would constitute a return to intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Here are several reasons why the European monetary authority should buy US bonds.
First, it solves the problem of what to buy without raising legal obstacles.
Operations in the foreign exchange market are well within the remit of the ECB.
Second, they also do not pose moral hazard issues --unless one thinks of the long-term moral hazard that the "exorbitant privilege" of printing the world's international currency creates for US fiscal policy.
Third, ECB purchases of dollars would help push the foreign exchange value of the euro down against the dollar. Such foreign exchange operations among G-7 central banks have fallen into disuse in recent years, in part because of the theory that they don't affect exchange rates except when they change money supplies. There is some evidence to the contrary, that even sterilized intervention can be effective, including for the euro.
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But in any case we are talking about an ECB purchase of dollars that would change the euro money supply. The increased supply of euros would lower their foreign exchange value.
Monetary expansion that depreciates the currency is effective. It is more effective than monetary expansion that does not, especially when there is no scope for pushing short-term interest rates much lower.
19 E.g., Fatum and Hutchison (2002) .
Depreciation of the euro would be the best medicine for restoring international price competitiveness to the periphery countries and bringing their export sectors back to health. Of course they would devalue on their own if they had not given up their currencies for the euro ten years before the crisis (and if it were not for their eurodenominated debt). Depreciation of the euro as a whole is the answer.
Central banks should and do choose their monetary policies primarily to serve the interests of their own economies. The interests of those who live in other parts of the world come second. But proposals to coordinate policies internationally for mutual benefit are fair. How would ECB purchases of dollar bonds fare by the lights of G20 cooperation? Since 2013 the rest of the world has been worried about US interest rates going up, not coming down. After the Fed has stopped buying US treasury securities, it is a perfect time for the ECB to step in and buy some itself.
VII. Eurobond Solutions
Any solution to the fiscal crisis must meet two objectives, which conflict. One is short run and the other is long run.
The first necessary objective is to put Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries back on sustainable debt paths, defined as a long-term trajectory where the ratio of debt to GDP is declining rather than rising. Austerity won't restore debt sustainability.
It has raised debt/GDP ratios, not lowered them. A write-down would do it, but would then create moral hazard and thus make even it even harder to satisfy the second necessary objective.
That second objective is to reform the system so as to make it less likely that similar debt crises will recur anew in the future. Long-run fiscal rectitude is indeed the way to accomplish this. But it is hard to commit today to fiscal rectitude in the future.
Rules like the Maastricht criteria, no bailout clause and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) didn't work, because they were not enforceable. And for that reason, they were not credible from the beginning.
Eurobonds could be part of the solution, if designed properly to take into account fiscal fundamentals. These are bonds that would be the liability of euroland in the aggregate.
The creation of a standardized Eurobond market would bring a boost to help Despite all of Europe's problems, a Eurobond would be attractive to central bankers and other portfolio investors around the world, to diversify risk.
But that latent global demand for Eurobonds will not come forth unless they are by design backed up with solid economic and political fundamentals. Germany opposes Eurobonds on the sensible grounds that if individual national governments were allowed to issue them freely, the knowledge that somebody else was paying the bill would make the incentive to spend beyond their means worse than ever. This version of Eurobonds would be guaranteed to fail, both economically and politically. This seems to be the version that some have in mind, such as French president François Hollande, though it is hard to tell.
A different version of the Eurobond proposal gained some traction in Germany in 2012. The German Council of Economic Experts -often called "wise men" -proposed a
European Redemption Fund (Bofinger, et al, 2011) . The plan would convert into de facto Eurobonds the existing debt of member nations in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified in the Maastricht and SGP criteria. The ERF bonds would then be paid off over 25 years, thus settling the huge legacy problem. Steps toward this proposed solution to the short-term debt problem were to be paired -politically and logically -with approval of the Fiscal Compact which was supposed to solve the longterm problem.
But this seems backwards. Yes, any solution to save the euro indeed carries a further implicit price tag for German taxpayers. But to use Eurobonds as the mechanism for eliminating the big debt overhang looks like the nail in the coffin of the longer term objective of limiting moral hazard. It offers absolution precisely on the margin where countries in the future will in any case have the most trouble resisting the temptation to sin again, the margin where they cross the 60% threshold.
If the Fiscal Compact could be relied on as a firm constraint on future behavior, then fine. But there is no reason to believe that it would and every reason to believe that it would not. Why should the Fiscal Compact succeed where the Maastricht criteria failed, the "no bailout" clause failed, and the SGP failed? Rules don't work without some enforcement mechanism. The problem with the SGP wasn't that it wasn't written strictly enough. The problem with the SGP was that no matter how many times a member government's deficit or debt exceeded the specified limit, the country's officials could always say that the gap was the fault of unexpected circumstances such as slow growth and low tax receipts and that they expect to do better next time.
Official forecasts of GDP and budget deficits are systematically biased in the optimistic direction, even more so among Eurozone governments than among other countries (Frankel, 2011 ; and other references cited therein). Greece is a particularly egregious case, but most of the other euro members have also been overly optimistic, as figures 7-9 illustrate. When a Eurozone government finds itself with a deficit above the 3% limit, it adjusts its forecast to show the deficit coming back down below the limit in the coming few years, without adjusting its actual policies (Frankel and Schreger, 2013) .
This statistically significant tendency is reduced when the country gives the fiscal forecasting job to an independent agency. This could be an important lesson for the design of institutions under the Fiscal Compact. A penalty of having to make up the difference next year does not improve credibility. Even if some court in Brussels or Frankfurt were given life-and-death power to enforce the rules, who exactly would it punish, and how? No version of the SGP or Fiscal Compact has ever provided a credible answer to that question.
The version of Eurobonds that might work is almost the reverse of the German wisemen's proposal. It goes under the name of "blue bonds," proposed by Delpla and von Weizäcker (2010) . Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60% criteria would receive Eurozone backing and effectively become Eurobonds. These are the "blue bonds" that would be viewed as safe by investors. When a country issued debt above the 60% threshold, the resulting "red bonds" would lose Eurozone backing.
The individual member state would be liable for them.
As I see it 20 , the private markets could make the judgment as to whether a country was in the process of crossing the 60% threshold, even before the final statistics were available, and therefore whether a new default risk required an interest rate premium. If private investors judged that the new debt had genuinely been incurred in temporary circumstances beyond the government's control (say, a weather disaster), then they would not impose a large interest rate penalty. Otherwise, the sovereign risk premium would operate, much as it does among American states, and much as it did in Italy, Greece and the others before they joined the euro. The point is that the mechanism would be truly automatic, as desired. Perhaps in ambiguous borderline cases the judgment whether a country had truly exceeded the limit would ultimately have to be made by a court. But private investors would not wait; they would act from moment to 20 Frankel (2012) .
28 moment on informed views about the merits. The resulting market interest rates would provide the missing discipline. Compliance would not rely on discretionary letters from Brussels bureaucrats, which have been proven toothless no matter how many exclamation points are put at the end of their penalty threats.
The euro countries cannot jump to a blue bond regime without first solving the debt overhang problem that is front and center. Unsustainable debt paths in many countries resulted from the combination of debt/GDP ratios that were already far in excess of 60%, high sovereign spreads in the most troubled countries, and negative growth rates.
Eurobonds are not the solution to these vexing problems. It is hard to say, at this late date, what the right short-term solutions are. Easier euro-wide monetary policy would help. In Greece's case, it may be forced to restructure again.
But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers will not be happy when asked to put up still more money in the cause of European integration by the same elites whose assurances of the last 20 years have proven false. They will at a minimum need some credible reason to believe that future repetitions in the future have been rendered unlikely, that the bailout is "just this once." Official assurances do not constitute that credible reason. The red bonds / blue bonds scheme just might.
